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Abstract: In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways,
namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies
with transferable technologies. From a cooperative point of view this leads
to two di®erent classes of cooperative games. We show that cooperative
oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and
that cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technologies are totally
balanced, but not necessarily convex.
Key-words: Oligopolies, cooperative games, convexity, total balancedness.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a cooperative approach to oligopoly situations.
Hereby we will distinguish two di®erent types of oligopolies, namely oligopo-
lies with transferable technologies and oligopolies without transferable tech-
nologies. The ¯rst type is characterized by the fact that a group of coop-
erating ¯rms is allowed to produce according to the cheapest technology
present in this group, whereas such a transfer of technologies is not possible
for the second type of oligopolies. An illustrative example of the ¯rst type
is a collection of potato farmers. Every farmer faces its speci¯c costs for the
production of one ton of potatoes, which strongly depend upon the sowing
and irrigation techniques used by the farmer. Cooperating farmers are able
to exchange their production techniques, i.e. their knowledge, which is a
costless operation. An example of an oligopoly without transferable tech-
nologies is a group of ¯shery companies harvesting some species of ¯sh. The
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costs for the production of one ton of ¯sh is heavily related to the type of
ships owned by a ¯rm. In such a situation cooperating ¯rms can not trans-
fer their technologies, since such an operation would imply that some ¯rms
have to replace their °eet. Another example of an oligopoly without trans-
ferable technologies is a group of oil producing countries, each having their
own costs for the production of one barrel of oil. For obvious geographical
reasons a country like Norway can not produce oil at the same costs as for
example Saudi Arabia, even not in case of cooperation.
Usually, oligopoly situations are modeled by means of non-cooperative
games. Aumann (1959) introduced two ways of converting a non-cooperative
game into a cooperative one. In the ¯rst approach every coalition computes
the amount of money which they can guarantee themselves regardless what
the players outside the coalition do. The second approach computes for
every coalition the minimal amount of money which is such that the play-
ers outside the coalition can prevent that the players in the coalition get
more. Zhao (1999) showed that for the case of transferable technologies
these two approaches lead to the same cooperative game. For special cas-
es of oligopolies, e.g. oligopolies without capacity restrictions, Zhao (1999)
provides necessary and su±cient conditions for the convexity of these games.
In this paper we focus on the case of oligopolies without transferable
technologies. We show that the resulting cooperative game is a convex
game in general. Meinhardt (1999) and Driessen and Meinhardt (2000)
obtained this result already for the speci¯c case that all ¯rms are symmetric.
Moreover, using the same techniques as in the case of oligopolies without
transferable technologies, we are able to show that oligopoly games with
transferable technologies are totally balanced in general.
Section 2 contains some preliminaries. In section 3 the cooperative
oligopoly games, both with and without transferable technologies, are in-
troduced and a formula for the computation of the coalitional values of
these games is provided. Section 4 deals with the properties of coopera-
tive oligopoly games. It is shown that cooperative oligopoly games without
transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly
games with transferable technologies are totally balanced.
2 Preliminaries
We start this section with some notational conventions which will be used
throughout this paper. For a 2 IR we de¯ne a+ = maxfa; 0g. If N is a
2
¯nite (player) set and (Xi)i2N is a collection of non-empty (strategy) spaces
then, for every S µ N , S 6= ;, the Cartesian product ¦i2SXi is denoted by
XS . Moreover, if Xi µ IR for every i 2 N , and x = (xi)i2S 2 XS for some
S µ N , S 6= ;, then the sum Pi2T xi is denoted by x(T ) for every T µ S.
If (ci)i2S 2 IRS for some S µ N , S 6= ;, then cS = mini2S ci.
Consider a monopolistic producer of some good, whose maximum pro-
duction capacity is y > 0. Suppose that this monopolist faces the linear
inverse demand function p(t) = x ¡ t; t 2 [0; y], with x 2 IR. So, if the
monopolist produces t units of output, he can sell these at a price of x ¡ t
per unit of output. Note that the monetary scale is chosen in such a way
that an increase in output of one unit causes a decrease in price of one unit.
For technical reasons we allow x to be non-positive, although the economi-
cal interpretation in this case is meaningless. We assume moreover that the
monopolist can produce at zero costs. So, the monopolist faces the following
simple maximization problem
maximize (x ¡ t) ¢ t
such that t 2 [0; y]: (1)
We will refer to (1) as monopolistic optimization problem (x; y). One easily
veri¯es that the maximum of this problem is fy(x), where the function fy is
provided in the de¯nition below.





0 if x · 0
1
4x
2 if 0 < x · 2y
y(x ¡ y) if x > 2y:
In this paper the following properties of the functions ffygy>0 play an im-
portant role.
Proposition 1 The functions ffygy>0 have the following properties:
(i) fy is non-decreasing on IR for every y > 0;
(ii) fy is convex on IR for every y > 0, i.e., for every x 2 IR, a > 0, and
c ¸ 0 we have
fy(x) ¡ fy(x ¡ a) ¸ fy(x ¡ c) ¡ fy(x ¡ c ¡ a);
3
(iii) for every y1 > 0, y2 > 0 and x 2 IR we have fy1(x) ¡ fy1(x ¡ y2) ¸
fy2(x ¡ y1) ¡ fy2(x ¡ 2y1).
Proof





0 if x · 0
1
2x if 0 < x · 2y
y if x > 2y:
(ii) Follows by the fact that f 0y is non-decreasing on IR.
(iii) First note that fy1(x) + fy2(x ¡ 2y1) = fy1+y2(x) for every x 2 IR.
De¯ne the C1-function u : IR ! IR by
u(x) = fy1+y2(x) ¡ fy1(x ¡ y2) ¡ fy2(x ¡ y1):
Clearly u(x) = 0 for x · 0 and x ¸ 2(y1 + y2). Moreover, for every
x 2 (0; y1 + y2) we have
u0(x) = 12x ¡ maxf12(x ¡ y2); 0g ¡ maxf12(x ¡ y1); 0g
= 12x ¡ maxf12(2x ¡ y1 ¡ y2); 12(x ¡ y2); 12(x ¡ y1); 0g
> 0;
and for every x 2 (y1 + y2; 2y1 + 2y2) we have
u0(x) = 12x ¡ minf12(x ¡ y2); y1g ¡ minf12(x ¡ y1); y2g
= 12x ¡ minf12(2x ¡ y1 ¡ y2); 12(x + y2); 12(x + y1); y1 + y2g
< 0:
So, u is increasing on [0; y1+y2] and decreasing on [y1+y2; 2(y1+y2)].
Therefore, u(x) ¸ 0 for every x 2 [0; 2(y1 + y2)].
In this paper we also need the following minimax theorem.
Proposition 2 Let X and Z be compact topological spaces and let K :
X £ Z ! IR be a continuous function. Suppose, moreover, that there exists
































which ¯nishes the proof.
We conclude this section with some formal de¯nitions on cooperative games.
De¯nition 2 A cooperative game is a tuple (N; v), where N is the set of
players and v : 2N ! IR its characteristic function, with the convention that
v(;) = 0. The core of a cooperative game (N; v) is the set
C(v) = fx 2 IRN : x(N) = v(N); x(S) ¸ v(S) for every S µ Ng:
If C(v) 6= ; the game (N; v) is balanced. A cooperative game (N; v) is
totally balanced if for every S µ N; S 6= ; the subgame (S; vS), where vS is
the restriction of v to 2S, is balanced. A cooperative game (N; v) is convex
(Shapley (1971)) if for every i; j 2 N and every S µ Nnfi; jg we have
v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) · v(S [ fi; jg) ¡ v(S [ fjg).
3 Oligopoly games
An oligopoly with linear inverse demand function is completely described by
the tuple (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b). Here N = f1; : : : ; ng is the collection of
¯rms, yi > 0 is the maximal production (capacity) of ¯rm i, ci > 0 is the
marginal cost of ¯rm i, i.e. the cost for the production of one unit of output.
The constant b ¸ 0 is the intercept of the inverse demand function: if total
production is x then the price per unit of output is maxfb¡x; 0g = (b¡x)+.
Without loss of generality we assume that the ¯rms are ranked according to
their marginal costs, i.e. c1 · c2 · ¢ ¢ ¢ · cn.
Corresponding to the oligopoly above the strategic oligopoly game ¡ =
(N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N) is de¯ned by
Xi = [0; yi] (2)
for every i 2 N , and
ui(x) = (b ¡ x(N))+ ¢ xi ¡ cixi (3)
5
for every i 2 N and every x = (xi)i2N 2 XN .
Aumann (1959) introduced two ways of converting a non-cooperative game
(N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N) into a cooperative game. The ¯rst approach leads
to the cooperative game (N; v®) which is obtained by computing for every
coalition S the amount of money which the players in S can guarantee
themselves regardless what the players outside S do. The second approach
results in the game (N; v¯) by computing for every coalition S the minimal
amount of money which is such that the players outside S can prevent
that the players in S get more. In the next subsection we will show that
for oligopoly games these two cooperative games coincide, leading to the
class of cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies. In
subsection 3.2 the approach of Zhao (1999) is followed, where every member
in a coalition can produce according to the cheapest technology present in
this coalition. Again, in the spirit of Aumann (1959), two cooperative games
are de¯ned which turn out to coincide. This leads to the class of cooperative
oligopoly games with transferable technologies.
3.1 Cooperative oligopoly games without transferable tech-
nologies
Let (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse demand func-
tion and let ¡ = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N) be the corresponding oligopoly game
as de¯ned by (2) and (3). The cooperative game (N; vnt® ) is de¯ned by
















for every S ½ N , S 6= ; and












whereas the cooperative game (N; vnt¯ ) is de¯ned by
















for every S ½ N , S 6= ; and











The superscript nt in (N; vnt® ) and (N; v
nt
¯ ) is an abbreviation for `not trans-
ferable'. The following proposition shows that the games (N; vnt® ) and
(N; vnt¯ ) coincide.
Proposition 3 Let (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b) be an oligopoly with linear in-
verse demand function and let (N; vnt® ) and (N; v
nt
¯ ) be de¯ned by (4)-(7).
Then
vnt® (S) = v
nt
¯ (S) = max
x2XS




for every S µ N .
Proof Let S µ N and de¯ne the continuous functions fS : XS ! IR and
gS : XS ! IR by









for every x 2 XS . Clearly, we have fS(x) ¸ gS(x) for every x 2 XS .
If x̂ 2 XS is such that fS(x̂) > gS(x̂) then b ¡ y(NnS) ¡ x̂(S) < 0 and
x̂(S) > 0. Hence fS(x̂) = ¡
P
i2S cix̂i < 0 = fS(x
0), where x0 2 XS is given







Therefore, in order to establish (8), it is su±cient to prove that
vnt® (S) = v
nt
¯ (S) = max
x2XS
fS(x)
for every S µ N . Note that
vnt® (N) = v
nt




by de¯nition. Therefore, let S ½ N , S 6= ;. De¯ne the compact sets
X = XS = ¦i2S [0; yi], Z = XNnS = ¦i2NnS[0; yi], and the continuous








De¯ne z¤ 2 Z by z¤i = yi for every i 2 NnS. One easily veri¯es that
minz2Z K(x; z) = K(x; z¤) = fS(x) for every x 2 X. Application of Propo-
sition 2 yields
vnt® (S) = v
nt
¯ (S) = max
x2XS
fS(x):
De¯nition 3 Let (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse
demand function. The game (N; vnt® ), de¯ned by (4) and (5) (which is
equal to the game (N; vnt¯ ) de¯ned by (6) and (7)), is called the coopera-
tive oligopoly game without transferable technologies corresponding to the
oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b), and will be denoted by (N; vnt).
The following proposition indicates how to compute the values of coalitions
in cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies.
Proposition 4 Let (N; vnt) be the cooperative oligopoly game without trans-
ferable technologies, corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b).











Proof Let S µ N , S 6= ;. Write S = fs1; : : : ; skg with s1 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < sk, and





where the C1-function gS : XS ! IR is given by
gS(x) = (b




Let x¤ = (x¤i )i2S 2 XS be such that vnt(S) = gS(x¤). In order to maximize
gS one should use the ¯rms with lowest marginal cost ¯rst. For, if i; j 2 S
with i < j are such that x¤i < yi and x
¤
j > 0 then a decrease of x
¤
j by some
amount " > 0 and an increase of x¤i by the same amount does not decrease
the value of the objective function gS . Hence, we may assume that x
¤ is
such that x¤j > 0 for some j 2 S implies x¤i = yi for every i 2 S with i < j.
In order to prove (9) we will distinguish four cases.
Case 1: x¤sl = 0 for every l 2 f1; : : : ; kg.




(x¤) = b0 ¡ cs1 · 0:
As a consequence, b0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j · b0 ¡ cs1 · 0 for every j 2 S. Therefore,
vnt(S) = gS(x
¤) = 0 =
P
j2S fyj(b
0 ¡ cj ¡ yS;j).
Case 2: there is an m 2 f1; : : : ; k¡1g with x¤sl = ysl for every l 2 f1; : : : ;mg
and x¤sl = 0 for every l 2 fm + 1; : : : ; kg.
Since x¤sm = ysm, x
¤








(x¤) = b0 ¡ 2yS;sm+1 ¡ csm+1 · 0:
For every j 2 S; j · sm we have b0¡cj¡2yS;j ¸ 2yS;sm+1 +csm ¡cj¡2yS;j ¸
2yj, and hence fyj(b
0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j) = yj(b0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j ¡ yj). For every
j 2 S; j ¸ sm+1 we have b0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j · 2yS;sm+1 + csm+1 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j · 0,
and hence fyj (b
0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j) = 0. Therefore,
vnt(S) = gS(x











0 ¡ cs1 ¡ ys1)+
ys2(b
0 ¡ cs2 ¡ 2ys1 ¡ ys2)+
ys3(b

















0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j):
Case 3: there is an m 2 f1; : : : ; kg with 0 < x¤sm < ysm (and hence x¤sl = ysl
for every l 2 f1; : : : ; m ¡ 1g and x¤sl = 0 for every l 2 fm + 1; : : : ; kg).




(x¤) = b0 ¡ 2
mX
l=1
x¤sl ¡ csm = 0
or, equivalently, x¤sm =
1
2(b
0 ¡ csm ¡ 2yS;sm). Hence b0 ¡ csm ¡ 2yS;sm =
2x¤sm 2 (0; 2ysm), and, as a consequence, fysm (b0¡csm¡2yS;sm) = 14(b0¡csm¡
2yS;sm)
2. Moreover, for every j 2 S; j < sm we have b0¡cj¡2yS;j ¸ 2yS;sm+
csm¡cj¡2yS;j ¸ 2yj, and hence fyj (b0¡cj¡2yS;j) = yj(b0¡cj¡2yS;j¡yj). For
every j 2 S; j ¸ sm+1 we have b0¡cj¡2yS;j · 2yS;sm+1+csm¡cj¡2yS;j · 0,
and hence fyj (b
0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j) = 0. Therefore,
vnt(S) = gS(x




































0 ¡ csm ¡ 2yS;sm ¡ x¤sm)
= ys1(b
0 ¡ cs1 ¡ ys1)+
ys2(b
0 ¡ cs2 ¡ 2ys1 ¡ ys2)+
ys3(b















0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j):
Case 4: x¤sl = ysl for every l 2 f1; : : : ; kg.




(x¤) = b0 ¡ 2y(S) ¡ csk ¸ 0:
For every j 2 S we have b0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j ¸ 2y(S) + csk ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j ¸ 2yj and
hence fyj (b
0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j) = yj(b0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j ¡ yj). Therefore,
vnt(S) = gS(x











0 ¡ cs1 ¡ ys1)+
ys2(b
0 ¡ cs2 ¡ 2ys1 ¡ ys2)+
ys3(b
0 ¡ cs3 ¡ 2ys1 ¡ 2ys2 ¡ ys3)+
...
+ysk(b













0 ¡ cj ¡ 2yS;j):
Remark Proposition 4 states that in order to compute the value vnt(S)
one has to solve a monopolistic optimization problem for every ¯rm in S.
If S = fs1; s2; : : : ; skg with s1 < s2 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < sk, one ¯rst has to solve a
monopolistic optimization problem for ¯rm s1, i.e. the ¯rm in S with lowest
marginal cost. Which monopolistic optimization problem (v; y) should be
solved for ¯rm s1? Clearly, y should be equal to ys1, the maximum capacity
of ¯rm s1. Furthermore, the number v should express approximately the
pro¯t per unit of output, if ¯rm s1 produces a very small amount of output.
Taking into account that the player in NnS produce at maximal capacity in
11
order to decrease the pro¯ts for S as much as possible and the fact that ¯rm
s1 produces at costs cs1 per unit of output, we get v = b ¡ y(NnS) ¡ cs1 .
Which monopolistic optimization problem (v; y) should be solved for ¯rm
s2? Of course y should be equal to ys2. If coalition S is going to use the
capacity of ¯rm s2, it is clear that S uses ¯rm s1 already at full capacity.
So, it is tempting to conclude that v = b ¡ y(NnS)¡ cs2 ¡ ys1 . However, by
doing this one neglects the fact that every unit produced by ¯rm s2 decreas-
es the selling price by one unit, and, as a consequence, the pro¯ts generated
by ¯rm s1 by ys1 units. In order to take also this e®ect into account one
should use v = b ¡ y(NnS) ¡ cs2 ¡ 2ys1. Similar arguments can be used for
¯rms s3; : : : ; sk.
Example 1 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable
technologies (N; vnt), corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b)
with N = f1; 2; 3g, y1 = 14, y2 = 8, y3 = 12, c1 = 2, c2 = 4, c3 = 16, and
b = 60. How to calculate e.g. vnt(f1; 3g)? Firm 1 faces the monopolistic
optimization problem (x; y) with x = b¡y2¡c1 = 50 and y = y1 = 14, so its
pro¯t is fy(x) = f14(50) = 504. Firm 3 faces the monopolistic optimization
problem (x; y) with x = b ¡ y2 ¡ c3 ¡ 2y1 = 8 and y = y3 = 12, so its pro¯t
is fy(x) = f12(8) = 16. Therefore, v
nt(f1; 3g) = 504+16 = 520. Proceeding
in this way we get the following table
S contribution contribution contribution vnt(S)
of player 1 of player 2 of player 3
f1g f14(38) = 336 ¡ ¡ 336
f2g ¡ f8(30) = 176 ¡ 176
f3g ¡ ¡ f12(22) = 121 121
f1; 2g f14(46) = 448 f8(16) = 64 ¡ 512
f1; 3g f14(50) = 504 ¡ f12(8) = 16 520
f2; 3g ¡ f8(42) = 272 f12(14) = 49 321
f1; 2; 3g f14(58) = 616 f8(28) = 160 f12(0) = 0 776
The last column of this table provides the game (N; vnt).
3.2 Cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technolo-
gies
In this subsection we follow the approach of Zhao (1999) where cooperat-
ing ¯rms can use the cheapest technology available. Consider, once again,
the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b). In the spirit of Aumann (1959), the
12





[(b ¡ z(NnS) ¡ x(S))+ ¢ x(S) ¡ cS ¢ x(S)] (11)
for every S ½ N , S 6= ; and
vt®(N) = max
x2XN
[(b ¡ x(N))+ ¢ x(N) ¡ cN ¢ x(N)]; (12)





[(b ¡ z(NnS) ¡ x(S))+ ¢ x(S) ¡ cS ¢ x(S)] (13)
for every S ½ N , S 6= ; and
vt¯(N) = max
x2XN
[(b ¡ x(N))+ ¢ x(N) ¡ cN ¢ x(N)]: (14)
The superscript t in (N; vt®) and (N; v
t
¯) is an abbreviation for `transferable'.




Proposition 5 Let (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b) be an oligopoly with linear in-
verse demand function and let (N; vt®) and (N; v
t
¯) be de¯ned by (11)-(14).
Then
vnt® (S) = v
nt
¯ (S) = max
x2XS
[(b ¡ y(NnS) ¡ x(S)) ¢ x(S) ¡ cS ¢ x(S)] (15)
for every S µ N .
Proof The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3 with functions
functions fS : XS ! IR and gS : XS ! IR de¯ned by
fS(x) = (b ¡ y(NnS) ¡ x(S))+ ¢ x(S) ¡ cS ¢ x(S);
and
gS(x) = (b ¡ y(NnS) ¡ x(S)) ¢ x(S) ¡ cS ¢ x(S)
for every x 2 XS .
13
De¯nition 4 Let (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse
demand function. The game (N; vt®), de¯ned by (11) and (12) (which is
equal to the game (N; vt¯) de¯ned by (13) and (14)), is called the cooperative
oligopoly game with transferable technologies corresponding to the oligopoly
(N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b), and will be denoted by (N; vt).
The following proposition shows how to compute the values of coalitions in
cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technologies.
Proposition 6 Let (N; vt) be the cooperative oligopoly game with trans-
ferable technologies, corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b).




fyj (b ¡ cS ¡ y(NnS) ¡ 2yS;j): (16)








where the C1-function gS : [0; y(S)] ! IR is given by gS(t) = (b0 ¡ cS ¡ t)t
for every t 2 [0; y(S)]. Let t¤ 2 [0; y(S)] be such that vt(S) = gS(t¤). In
order to prove (16) we distinguish three cases.
Case 1: t¤ = 0.
Since gS is maximal at t
¤ = 0 we have g0S(0) = b
0 ¡ cS · 0. Consequently
we have b0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j · 0 for every j 2 S and hence vt(S) = gS(0) = 0 =P
j2S fyj (b
0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j).
Case 2: t¤ 2 (0; y(S)).
Since gS is maximal at t
¤ we have g0S(t
¤) = b0 ¡ cS ¡ 2t¤ = 0, and hence
t¤ = 12(b
0 ¡ cS). Let j¤ 2 S be such that t¤ 2 (yS;j¤ ; yS;j¤ + yj¤ ]. Then
b0 = cS+2t
¤ 2 (cS+2yS;j¤ ; cS+2yS;j¤+2yj¤ ], and hence fyj¤ (b0¡cS¡2yS;j¤) =
1
4(b
0¡cS¡2yS;j¤)2. Moreover, for every j 2 S; j < j¤ we have b0¡cS¡2yS;j ¸
2yS;j¤ ¡ 2yS;j ¸ 2yj, and hence fyj (b0¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j) = yj(b0¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j ¡ yj).
For every j 2 S; j > j¤ we have b0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j · 2yS;j¤ + 2yj¤ ¡ 2yS;j · 0,
and hence fyj (b
0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j) = 0. Therefore,
vt(S) = gS(t













0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j):
Case 3: t¤ = y(S).
Since gS is maximal at t
¤ = y(S) we have g0S(t
¤) = b0 ¡ cS ¡ 2y(S) ¸ 0.
For every j 2 S we have b0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j ¸ 2y(S) ¡ 2yS;j ¸ 2yj and hence
fyj (b
0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j) = yj(b0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j ¡ yj). Therefore,
vt(S) = gS(t










0 ¡ cS ¡ 2yS;j):
Remark Proposition 6 states that in order to compute the value vt(S)
one has to solve a monopolistic optimization problem for every ¯rm in S.
The description of these monopolistic optimization problems is completely
analogous to the description of the monopolistic optimization problems in
the remark after Proposition 4. The only di®erence is that the marginal
cost for every ¯rm has to be replaced with the lowest marginal cost in the
coalition.
Example 2 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable tech-
nologies (N; vt), corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b) in Ex-
ample 1. How to calculate e.g. vt(f1; 2g)? Firm 1 faces the monopolistic
optimization problem (x; y) with x = b¡y3¡c1 = 46 and y = y1 = 14, so its
pro¯t is fy(x) = f14(46) = 448. Firm 2 faces the monopolistic optimization
problem (x; y) with x = b ¡ y3 ¡ c1 ¡ 2y1 = 18 and y = y2 = 8, so its pro¯t
is fy(x) = f8(18) = 80. Therefore, vt(f1; 2g) = 448 + 80 = 528. Proceeding
in this way we get the following table
S contribution contribution contribution vt(S)
of player 1 of player 2 of player 3
f1g f14(38) = 336 ¡ ¡ 336
f2g ¡ f8(30) = 176 ¡ 176
f3g ¡ ¡ f12(22) = 121 121
f1; 2g f14(46) = 448 f8(18) = 80 ¡ 528
f1; 3g f14(50) = 504 ¡ f12(22) = 121 625
f2; 3g ¡ f8(42) = 272 f12(26) = 168 440
f1; 2; 3g f14(58) = 616 f8(30) = 176 f12(14) = 49 841
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The last column of this table provides the game (N; vt).
4 Properties of oligopoly games
In this section we use the results of the previous section in order to prove
some properties of cooperative oligopoly games. In subsection 4.1 we show
that oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games
and in subsection 4.2 we show that oligopoly games with transferable tech-
nologies are totally balanced.
4.1 Properties of oligopoly games without transferable tech-
nologies
In order to prove the main result of this section we ¯rst need a lemma.
Lemma 1 Let (N; vnt) be the cooperative oligopoly game without transfer-
able technologies corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b). Let
l; m 2 N; l < m and let S µ Nnfl; mg be such that S \fl+1; :::;m¡1g = ;.
Then we have
vnt(S [ fl;mg) ¡ vnt(S [ flg) ¡ vnt(S [ fmg) + vnt(S) ¸ 0:
Proof We write xT ;i = fyi(b¡ ci¡y(NnT )¡2yT;i) for every T µ N , i 2 T .
First note that
(xS[fl;mg;l ¡ xS[flg;l) + (xS[fl;mg;m ¡ xS[fmg;m)
= fyl(b ¡ cl ¡ y(Nn(S [ fl; mg)) ¡ 2yS[fl;mg;l)
¡fyl(b ¡ cl ¡ y(Nn(S [ flg)) ¡ 2yS[flg;l)
+fym(b ¡ cm ¡ y(Nn(S [ fl; mg)) ¡ 2yS[fl;mg;m)
¡fym(b ¡ cm ¡ y(Nn(S [ fmg)) ¡ 2yS[fmg;m)
= fyl(b ¡ cl ¡ y(NnS) + yl + ym ¡ 2yS;l)
¡fyl(b ¡ cl ¡ y(NnS) + yl ¡ 2yS;l)
+fym(b ¡ cm ¡ y(NnS) ¡ yl + ym ¡ 2yS;l)
¡fym(b ¡ cm ¡ y(NnS) + ym ¡ 2yS;l)
¸ fyl(b ¡ cm ¡ y(NnS) + yl + ym ¡ 2yS;l)
¡fyl(b ¡ cm ¡ y(NnS) + yl ¡ 2yS;l)
+fym(b ¡ cm ¡ y(NnS) ¡ yl + ym ¡ 2yS;l)
¡fym(b ¡ cm ¡ y(NnS) + ym ¡ 2yS;l)
¸ 0;
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where at the ¯rst inequality we used Proposition 1 (ii) with y = yl, x =
b¡ cl¡y(NnS)+yl+ym¡2yS;l, a = ym, and c = cm¡cl, and at the second
inequality we used Proposition 1 (iii) with x = b¡ cm¡y(NnS)+ yl+ ym¡
2yS;l, y1 = yl, and y2 = ym. Further, for j 2 S, j < l we have
xS[fl;mg;j ¡ xS[flg;j ¡ xS[fmg;j + xS;j
= fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(Nn(S [ fl; mg)) ¡ 2yS[fl;mg;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(Nn(S [ flg)) ¡ 2yS[flg;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(Nn(S [ fmg)) ¡ 2yS[fmg;j)
+fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) ¡ 2yS;j)
= fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) + yl + ym ¡ 2yS;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) + yl ¡ 2yS;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) + ym ¡ 2yS;j)
+fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) ¡ 2yS;j)
¸ 0;
because of Proposition 1 (ii) with y = yj, x = b¡cj¡y(NnS)+yl+ym¡2yS;j,
a = ym, and c = yl. Finally, for j 2 S, j > m we have
xS[fl;mg;j ¡ xS[flg;j ¡ xS[fmg;j + xS;j
= fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(Nn(S [ fl; mg)) ¡ 2yS[fl;mg;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(Nn(S [ flg)) ¡ 2yS[flg;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(Nn(S [ fmg)) ¡ 2yS[fmg;j)
+fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) ¡ 2yS;j)
= fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) ¡ yl ¡ ym ¡ 2yS;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) ¡ yl ¡ 2yS;j)
¡fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) ¡ ym ¡ 2yS;j)
+fyj(b ¡ cj ¡ y(NnS) ¡ 2yS;j)
¸ 0;
because of Proposition 1 (ii) with y = yj , x = b¡cj¡y(NnS)¡2yS;j , a = yl,
and c = ym. According to Proposition 4 we have

















(xS[fl;mg;j ¡ xS[flg;j ¡ xS[fmg;j + xS;j)
+(xS[fl;mg;l ¡ xS[flg;l) + (xS[fl;mg;m ¡ xS[fmg;m)
¸ 0:
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Theorem 1 Every cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technolo-
gies is convex.
Proof In order to show that every cooperative oligopoly game without
transferable technologies is convex it su±ces to show that for every co-
operative oligopoly game without transferable technologies (N; vnt), every
l; m 2 N with l < m, and every S µ Nnfl; mg we have vnt(S [ fl; mg) ¡
vnt(S [flg) ¡ vnt(S [ fmg)+ vnt(S) ¸ 0. We will prove this with induction
to k = jS \ fl + 1; : : : ;m ¡ 1gj, i.e. with induction to the number of players
in S between l and m.
Induction basis: Let (N; vnt) be a cooperative oligopoly game without trans-
ferable technologies, l; m 2 N with l < m, and S µ Nnfl; mg such that
jS \ fl + 1; : : : ; m ¡ 1gj = 0:
According to Lemma 1 we have vnt(S [ fl;mg) ¡ vnt(S [ flg) ¡ vnt(S [
fmg) + vnt(S) ¸ 0.
Induction step: Let k 2 IN and suppose that for every cooperative oligopoly
game without transferable technologies (N; vnt), every l; m 2 N with l < m,
every S µ Nnfl;mg such that
jS \ fl + 1; : : : ;m ¡ 1gj · k ¡ 1
we have vnt(S [ fl; mg) ¡ vnt(S [ flg) ¡ vnt(S [ fmg) + vnt(S) ¸ 0.
Let (N; vnt) be a cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technolo-
gies, corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b), let l;m 2 N with
l < m, and let S µ Nnfl;mg be such that
jS \ fl + 1; : : : ;m ¡ 1gj = k:
De¯ne l¤ = minS \ fl + 1; : : : ;m ¡ 1g. Let (N;wnt) be the coopera-
tive oligopoly game without transferable technologies corresponding to the
oligopoly (N; (y0i)i2N ; (c
0
i)i2N ; b), de¯ned by y
0
i = yi for every i 2 N , c0i = cl¤
for every i 2 fl; l + 1; : : : ; l¤g, c0i = ci for all other i. Then, we ¯nd
(vnt(S [ fl;mg) ¡ vnt(S [ flg) ¡ vnt(S [ fmg) + vnt(S))
¡(wnt(S [ fl;mg) ¡ wnt(S [ flg) ¡ wnt(S [ fmg) + wnt(S))
= fyl(b ¡ cl ¡ y(NnS) + yl + ym ¡ 2yS;l)
¡fyl(b ¡ cl ¡ y(NnS) + yl ¡ 2yS;l)
¡fyl(b ¡ cl¤ ¡ y(NnS) + yl + ym ¡ 2yS;l)




where the equality follows by using (9) and the fact that player l is the only
player in S [ fl; mg whose marginal cost has been changed. The inequality
follows by Proposition 1 (ii) with y = yl, x = b¡cl¡y(NnS)+yl+ym¡2yS;l,
a = ym, and c = cl¤ ¡ cl.
Let (N; unt) be the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable tech-
nologies, corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (y00i )i2N ; (c
00











i for every i 2 Nnfl; l¤g, and c00i = c0i for every
i 2 N . De¯ne S0 = (S[flg)nfl¤g. One easily veri¯es that unt(S0[fl¤; mg) =
wnt(S[fl; mg), unt(S0[fl¤g) = wnt(S[flg), unt(S0[fmg) = wnt(S[fmg),
and unt(S0) = wnt(S). Since jS0 \ fl¤ + 1; : : : ;m ¡ 1gj = k ¡ 1 we get by
induction hypothesis
unt(S0 [ fl¤;mg) ¡ unt(S0 [ fl¤g) ¡ unt(S0 [ fmg) + unt(S0) ¸ 0;
and hence
wnt(S [ fl;mg) ¡ wnt(S [ flg) ¡ wnt(S [ fmg) + wnt(S) ¸ 0:
By (17) we infer that
vnt(S [ fl;mg) ¡ vnt(S [ flg) ¡ vnt(S [ fmg) + vnt(S) ¸ 0;
which ¯nishes the proof.
4.2 Properties of oligopoly games with transferable tech-
nologies
In subsection 4.1 we have seen that every cooperative oligopoly game with-
out transferable technologies is convex. Zhao (1999) noted that this is not
true in general for cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technolo-
gies. The next example illustrates this once again.
Example 3 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable tech-
nologies (N; vt) of Example 2. One easily veri¯es that vt(123) ¡ vt(13) =
216 < 319 = vt(23) ¡ vt(3), which shows that (N; vt) is not convex.
However, we can show that every cooperative oligopoly game with trans-
ferable technologies is totally balanced. Moreover we can show that the
marginal vector, corresponding to the order which ranks the ¯rms in the
order of increasing marginal costs, provides a core element.
19
Proposition 7 Let (N; vt) be a cooperative oligopoly game with transferable
technologies, corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (ci)i2N ; b). Then
(N; vt) is totally balanced. Moreover, for the vector x 2 IRN , de¯ned by
xi = v
t(fj 2 N : j · ig) ¡ vt(fj 2 N : j · i ¡ 1g)
for every i 2 N , we have x 2 C(vt).
Proof First we note that every subgame (S; vtS) of (N; v
t), i.e. vtS(T ) =
vt(T ) for every T µ S, is a cooperative oligopoly game with transferable
technologies itself. In order to see this let S µ N , S 6= ;. From (16) one
easily derives that (S; vtS) is the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable
technologies, corresponding to the oligopoly (S; (ci)i2S ; (yi)i2S ; b0), where
b0 = (b ¡ y(NnS))+. Therefore, in order to prove the proposition, it is
su±cient to show that (N; vt) is balanced.
Therefore, let (N;w) be the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable
technologies, corresponding to the oligopoly (N; (yi)i2N ; (c0i)i2N ; b), where
c0i = c1 for every i 2 N . Since all ¯rms have equal cost, the cooperative
oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies, corresponding
to this oligopoly, coincide. Hence, according to Theorem 1, (N; w) is convex.
De¯ne the marginal vector y 2 IRN by
yi = w(fj 2 N : j · ig) ¡ w(fj 2 N : j · i ¡ 1g)
for every i 2 N . By convexity of (N;w) we have y 2 C(w). Moreover, due
to (16), we have vt(S) = w(S) for every S µ N with 1 2 S and vt(S) · w(S)
for all other S. As a consequence we get
x = y 2 C(w) µ C(vt):
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